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The Twenty Year Test: Principles 
for an Enduring Counterterrorism 
Legal Architecture
James E. Baker*
The United States faces three enduring terrorism-related threats. First, there is the realistic prospect of additional attacks in the United States including attacks using weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”). Second, 
in responding to this threat, we may undermine the freedoms that enrich our lives, the 
tolerance that marks our society, and the democratic values that define our govern-
ment. Third, if we are too focused on terrorism, we risk losing sight of this century’s 
other certain threats as well as the capacity to respond to them, including the state 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, nation-state rivalry, pandemic disease, oil depen-
dency, and environmental degradation. 
The United States should respond to these threats using all available and appropri-
ate security tools, on offense and in defense. Law is one of the essential security tools. 
Law provides substantive authority to act. Law can also provide and embed an effec-
tive process of preview and review to test proposals and validate actions, ensuring that 
they are both lawful and effective. Depending on how it is wielded, law can also serve 
as an independent policy value. However, the United States has been slow, or perhaps 
unwilling, to adopt a legal architecture that maximizes each of these legal benefits. 
Instead, the political branches have generally adopted an incremental approach, or re-
lied on (qua deferred to) the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to define 
the law. 
This paper describes four principles that should inform the design of a lasting legal 
architecture to counterterrorism: 
First, the architecture should reflect an understanding of  the strategic value of  law 
in substance, process, and policy. 
Second, the architecture should reflect the threats it is intended to address, includ-
ing the potential catastrophic nature of the physical threat, which distinguishes this 
form of terrorism from that of the past. That means the Executive should have broad 
and flexible authority to act. But, the law should also acknowledge that with greater 
authority comes increased risk of overreach and misuse. That favors a meaningful 
process of ongoing internal and external validation and appraisal. 
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Third, with limited exception, the law should avoid absolutes—in the authority 
asserted; in the authority prohibited; or, in bureaucratic design. Instead, we should fa-
vor statutes and directives that accent the role of meaningful process. Good process 
addresses concerns that national security is or will become myopic in vision or tactics. 
Thus, a good process does not define terrorism in military or law enforcement terms, 
but rather encourages policymakers to consider all options and adopt the best policy 
tool in context. Good process also provides for timely and meaningful legal input on 
the law and on legal policy.1 
 Finally, the architecture should be lasting, which means among other things that it 
should be “constitutionally inclusive” in design. A lasting and inclusive architecture 
will improve security—by maximizing the Executive’s authority to act, sustaining 
support for tools and policies, and improving the opportunity and efficacy to appraise 
U.S. actions. 
Part V of this paper discusses the application of these principles with reference to 
two controversial security instruments: detention and rendition. With these principles 
in mind, we must ask: where should we be in twenty years, and how do we get there 
today?
I. THE VALUE OF LAW 
Law is not an abstraction; it is an essential tool that helps us provide for our physi-
cal security and uphold and advance our constitutional values in doing so. Whether 
the law in fact serves these two purposes depends both on its design as well as the mor-
al courage and integrity of those who wield its authority; if wielded wisely and hon-
estly, law can play three critical and related roles. The law can provide the substantive 
authority to act. Law may also provide a procedural framework in which to act wisely 
and in timely fashion, including the architecture to meaningfully appraise U.S. actions. 
Finally, the law can also serve as a positive security tool, conveying societal values to a 
broader audience, as well as guiding policymakers to better substantive results. 
SubStantive	 authority: The law provides substantive authority for the 
Executive to act. This is an intuitive point; however, the security benefits of clear sub-
stantive authority embedded in law are not. When the authority to act is clear, and 
clearly demarcated in statute or executive directive, risk-taking increases in the field. 
This is especially true in intelligence practice. Consider the statement of former 
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) Assistant Deputy Director for Operations Robert 
Richer, “We were always conscious in the agency that we are judged not by the stan-
dards of today, but by the standards of tomorrow.”2 Uncertain authority can seed such 
caution; certain authority can mitigate it. 
Substantive law also provides for policy continuity in an area where public and po-
litical perceptions of the threat may vary depending on the physical and temporal 
proximity of the last attack. An enduring threat requires a sustained response—in 
building alliances, in how we deploy finite resources, and in how we apply the law. 
Where policy is embedded in law, it is more likely to survive the vicissitudes of public 
1	 The distinction is grossly summarized as the difference between “can” and “can’t” on the one hand, 
and the pros and cons that inform the “should” or “shouldn’t” in choosing between lawful options, on the 
other.
2 Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Question Time for Nominee Linked to Interrogations,	n.y. timeS,	
June 19, 2007, at A17.
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and political opinion. Many homeland security programs, for example, will only pay 
dividends over time and then only if the programs are sustained. A customs regime 
will hardly work if it is implemented at only 10 out of 351 ports of entry. 
ProceSS:	The law, in statute and executive directive, also helps to define national 
security process, which in turn defines procedural expectations and norms. Process 
addresses the twin pathologies of national security decision-making: secrecy and 
speed. Both are essential components of effective action; however, by design or de-
fault, speed and secrecy may also exclude critical viewpoints. Good process includes 
avenues to test ideas and assumptions, mitigate risks, voice dissent, and ensure that 
the long-term implications of policy options are considered along with the immediate 
security gains. Moreover, although some may find it counterintuitive, good process 
can improve speed through the use of tried and tested mechanisms, like the military 
chain of command.
Good process also helps to ensure that in addressing threats, we preserve and ad-
vance our constitutional values in doing so. That is because there is nothing automatic 
about the application of law to security policy. Process can create an expectation of 
legal review, as well as serve as the vehicle by which the lawyer gains access to policy 
deliberation. But the lawyer must then hold his or her place through the timely provi-
sion of meaningful advice. Where such process is embedded in statute or executive di-
rective, it is harder to avoid (or evade), and less likely to succumb to speed, secrecy, or 
the pressure of the moment when policy actors tend to focus on the immediate prob-
lem, and not the process of decision.
Security	value: Finally, law is itself a security policy value. To borrow from a 
related context: Law is about who we are. Law enables us to preserve and advance our 
constitutional values as we address security threats. These same legal values also en-
hance security. 
This is true on a tactical level, as former CIA case officer Milt Bearden has illus-
trated with reference to Soviet operations in Afghanistan. When Bearden arrived as 
U.S. intelligence liaison to the tribal mujahadeen he was shown a picture of a Soviet 
pilot who, having successfully parachuted from his stricken aircraft, shot himself in 
the head rather than be taken alive and tortured. Bearden objected, noting that the 
Afghan treatment violated the law of war. More effectively, he also noted the impact 
such treatment had on reciprocal practice and pointed out that the practice discour-
aged intelligence collection. Dead pilots don’t talk. A more humane and lawful prac-
tice followed. In course, some pilots chose defection or cooperation to suicide with re-
sulting tactical intelligence benefit to the mujahadeen and strategic intelligence benefit 
to the United States.3 
The point is also true on a macro level as illustrated by the Army’s 2006 
Counterinsurgency Manual, which describes in operational terms how the legal prin-
ciples of discrimination, proportionality, and necessity improve military efficacy and 
result. Similarly, perceptions about the U.S. application of law, in our handling of de-
tainees, fairly or unfairly, have undermined our capacity to collect intelligence through 
liaison, and damaged our ability to find, hold, and lead allies. They have also served 
as a source of propaganda and recruitment for our opponents. 
3	 Milt Bearden, When the C.I.A. Played by the Rules,	n.y. timeS, November 4, 2005, at A17.
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In the domestic context, perceptions of constitutional exceptionalism or divisive 
legal arguments are less likely to garner and sustain support for policies that will only 
work over time and through successive administrations. They will also undermine 
support for the creation and exercise of broad national security authority of the sort 
necessary to address the threat of WMD terrorism.
II. A FRAMEWORK COMMENSURATE WITH THE THREAT 
Disagreement over the shape of the law results in part from disagreement on the 
nature of the threats the law is intended to address. This is the product of honest dif-
ferences of view inherent in intelligence analysis, including how one defines and cal-
culates risk, probability, and cost. A nuclear attack (even an unsuccessful one), for ex-
ample, is surely less probable than a conventional suicide attack, but its cost in terms 
of human life,4 social impact, and economic destabilization is infinitely higher.
Different perspectives also derive from the use of “terrorism” as a political tool as 
well as a policy concept. Where politicians use “terrorism” or “liberty” as political 
banners, observers and particularly those with differing political outlooks, may dis-
count the validity of concerns otherwise embedded in political hyperbole. As a result, 
the audience may discount the message. 
 Is a nuclear attack a realistic threat? The government thinks so. Consider the 
President’s May 2007 Homeland Security Policy Directive, “National Continuity 
Policy,” the bureaucratic term to describe the continuation of government after a cata-
strophic emergency or event. Agencies are directed to reconstitute within twelve hours 
in the event of a “no-warning” attack, an apparent euphemism for a terrorist nuclear 
attack, or perhaps a cyber attack.5 The President has also directed that the govern-
ment develop the nuclear forensics capacity to trace the signature of a nuclear device 
after detonation.6 
Here is a dilemma. While we might reach an acceptable degree of risk-manage-
ment, we can never assume that we have eliminated the risk. As long as this threat is 
realistic, it does not matter whether experts place the probability of such an attack as 
“more likely than not”7 or at 10% per year;8 we must defend against it. 
WMD terrorism raises societal risks on both sides of the national security ledger 
that conventional terrorism does not. As a matter of physical security, a nuclear device 
could kill thousands, potentially many more, and reap untold economic devastation. 
As a liberty concern, a successful WMD attack could transform American society 
from one marked by tolerance and optimism to one marked by fear and isolation; 
government likely would be evaluated based on security indicators alone and not by 
its commitment to democratic due process and transparency.
4 Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has indicated that “for those within a two-mile wide 
circle around a Hiroshima-sized detonation or just downwind, little could be done.” William J. Perry, 
Ashton B. Carter & Michael M. May, After the Bomb,	tHe n.y. timeS, June 12, 2007, at A23.
5	 nAtionAl continUity policy, nSpd 51/HSpd	20	(May 9, 2007), available at	http://www.fas.
org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-51.htm (last visited May 25, 2007).
6 David Sanger & Thom Shanker, U.S. Debates Deterrence for Nuclear Terrorism,	n.y. timeS, May 
8, 2007, at A1.
7	 Graham Allison,	Fast Action Needed to Avert Nuclear Terror Strike on U.S.,	bAltimore SUn, July 
2, 2007, at 11A.
8 See Richard Garwin, Living with Nuclear Weapons: Sixty Years and Counting	 (Apr. 30, 2005) 
(transcript available at http://www.fas.org/rlg/050430-aps.pdf.)
 The Journal of the ACS Issue Groups 25 
The potential of nuclear terrorism is as enduring as it is likely catastrophic. It takes 
only a few zealous actors to sustain this threat and only one to succeed. Moreover, Al 
Qaeda and other extremists have stated, and intelligence indicates, that they have 
sought nuclear weapons and continue to do so.9 One does not need access to intelli-
gence to know that if they obtain them, they will try to use them. Rational deterrence, 
it would appear, is less effective against a non-state, messianic opponent, intent on de-
struction and without concern for the survival of its “soldiers,” nor a constructive 
agenda to preserve or a constituency to protect; Al Qaeda has no elite, fixed territory, 
or institution to protect and no positive political program to advance. Moreover, as 
Harvard’s Graham Allison has explained, it does not ultimately take a rocket scientist 
to make a “nuke.”10 It takes fissionable material. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the Department of Homeland Security indicate that there is such a supply 
of fissionable material potentially available to the terrorists.11 Therefore, while we 
might hope to reach an acceptable degree of risk management, we can never assume 
that we have eliminated the threat.
The dilemma is compounded because as 9/11 demonstrated, it does not take a 
WMD to have much the same effect. Consider that estimates place the lethal blast 
range of a tractor trailer loaded with 60,000 lbs of conventional explosives at 600 feet 
in diameter from the point of impact. Non-lethal collateral impact (as well as lethal 
depending on circumstance) would extend to 7,000 feet, and potentially further.12 In 
the words of the Defense Department’s senior Homeland Defense official, “Katrina 
by comparison to foreseeable terrorist attacks must be viewed as a catastrophic event 
at the low-end of the spectrum.”13 
a.	 broad	and	Flexible	intelligence	authority	
Intelligence is the essential ingredient in addressing the physical threat of terror-
ism. One might get lucky during a customs stop; but, as a general rule, one is not likely 
to find a sleeper cell embedded in New York or London or a nuclear device in a suit-
case without information garnered through intelligence means. Nor can one protect 
everything; rather, intelligence and intelligence analysis inform judgments about risk 
management and concentric defense. Intelligence is also the predicate for determining 
which of the security tools is best used in context. As Secretary Gates has said, “over 
the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory,”14 we must effectively use 
all the security tools including the law. 
9	 See, e.g., Nat’l Int. Council, Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead (Feb. 2, 2007) 
(Unclassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate); FBI Director Robert Mueller, Speech 
to the Global Initiative Nuclear Terrorism Conference (June 11, 2007), available at	http://www.fbi.gov/
pressrel/speeches/mueller061107.htm (last visited June 14, 2006).
10	 See, Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism (2004). More recently, Allison wrote: “Based on current 
trends, a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States is more likely than not in the decade ahead.” Graham 
Allison, No Loose Nukes: Preventing a Terrorist Nuclear Attack on the U.S.,	eveninG bUlletin (June 28, 
2007). 
11	 JAmeS e. bAker, in tHe common defenSe: nAtionAl SecUrity lAw for periloUS timeS 10	
(2007).
12 Spencer Hsu & Sari Horwitz, Impervious Shield Elusive Against Drive-By Terrorists,wASH. poSt, 
Aug. 8, 2004, at A1.
13	Ass’t Sec. of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale, quoted in	Geoff Fein,	Katrina Showed 
Need for Rapid Damage Assessment, Improved Communications, 231 Defense Daily 16, July 27, 2006.
14	Robert Gates, Speech to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign (July 15, 2008), available at	http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50518 (last visited July 23, 2008).
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The nature of the threat and the role of intelligence in responding means the gov-
ernment will by necessity push the intelligence envelope out, in many cases to the lim-
its of the law. CIA Director Hayden has explained: 
If you take nothing else from what I say, I hope it will be this: CIA 
operates only within the space given to us by the American people. 
That is how we want it to be, and that is how it should be. That 
space is defined by the policymakers we elect and the laws our rep-
resentatives pass. But once the laws are passed and the boundaries 
set, the American people expect CIA to use every inch we’re given 
to protect our fellow citizens.15 (Emphasis added.)
The extremist opponent is ruthless; he has also shown creative capacity in the means 
of attack, resilience in recovery, and an ability to adopt countermeasures. Without 
broad and flexible substantive authority, the intelligence instrument may miss critical 
intelligence. However, in the absence of express law, actors may hesitate to push, and 
in adhering to the law may lack authority to do so. Presidents and intelligence actors 
may do so anyway, relying on assertions of executive authority alone. This may dimin-
ish risk taking and will certainly minimize the processes of internal and external ap-
praisal, because such operations are necessarily conducted with secrecy.
b.	 a	correSPonding	ProceSS	oF	internal	and	external	review	
If the physical threat argues for a broad and flexible authority to act, exercise of 
that authority places added pressure on constitutional values. With increased authori-
ty, flexibility, and secrecy, comes increased risk of misuse. In liberty terms, three values 
may be tested: freedom, tolerance, and the democratic process of government. In se-
curity terms, we risk jeopardizing long-term support for the tools essential to address-
ing the physical threats ahead. 
Difficulty in finding an agreed and lasting intelligence framework, especially in the 
domestic context, is compounded because not everyone trusts the government to use 
the intelligence tools wisely or lawfully—with some cause. These tools are subject to 
witting and unwitting abuse and misuse,16 even if used exactly as intended. Why? 
Because even if they are used effectively there will remain a circular error probable 
(“CEP”), to borrow a term from nuclear doctrine. This is the measure of the radius of 
a circle within which half of the weapons fired will fall in relation to the intended tar-
get or at the aim point. I use the term to suggest that not all legal weapons fall within 
the intended target circle. Indeed, it is a necessary cultural tendency of security spe-
cialists to push this circle out (as opposed to nuclear doctrine where the goal is to di-
minish the circle’s size as an indicator of accuracy). When searching for a mole, for 
example, the counterintelligence specialist would rather investigate twenty honest 
15	Gen. Michael Hayden, Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations (as prepared for delivery) 
(Sept. 7, 2007),	 available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2007/general-
haydens-remarks-at-the-council-on-foreign-relations.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). 
16	The electronic surveillance instrument, for example, has been misused before. See e.g., S. Select 
comm. to StUdy GovernmentAl operAtionS witH reSpect to intelliGence ActivitieS, 94tH 
conG., finAl report	 (April 26, 1976) ("Church Committee Report”); comm. on ciA ActivitieS 
witHin tHe U.S., finAl report (June 6, 1975) (“Rockefeller Commission Report”); dep’t. of JUSt., A 
review of tHe federAl bUreAU of inveStiGAtion’S USe of nAtionAl SecUrity letterS (Mar. 2007) 
available at	http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf (raising more recent concerns about the 
misuse of National Security letters). 
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employees beyond the target circle than one spy short. Where we are searching for the 
potential nuclear terrorist, the CEP will increase. It should. The problem is that with 
expansion of the CEP, the risk of misuse, overuse, and potentially, abuse expands as 
well. In short, there are two structural risks—that security services will collect too lit-
tle; and that they will collect too much. The remedy is effective processes of internal 
and external review. 
Recall Director Hayden’s words about using every inch of available legal space. 
Consider as well the innate sense of mission security officials and their lawyers al-
ready feel, without direction from above. The potential impact on the culture and the 
shape of daily legal practice is apparent; the necessity for introspective, retrospective, 
and objective appraisal of U.S. actions should be as well. 
III.  AVOID ABSOLUTES IN SUBSTANCE; FAVOR GOOD PROCESS 
The law, by which I mean statutes as well as executive directives, can respond in 
three ways: (1) with express permits and prohibitions; (2) with required processes of 
decision; and/or (3) with mechanisms of internal and external appraisal. Proscriptions 
might be appropriate with respect to instruments or applications that inherently of-
fend U.S. values, like torture. However, most intelligence tools are not inherently im-
moral or unlawful—like data mining, liaison, or electronic surveillance. Rather, the 
legality and morality of their use depends on context. Therefore, the better course is 
to craft laws and directives oriented toward meaningful processes of decision and ap-
praisal that can weigh the legal and policy costs and benefits of action in context, 
rather than seek to regulate behavior with substantive and absolute permits and 
prohibitions. 
Zero-sum solutions, which posit false substantive choices between security and lib-
erty, risk not effectively providing for either our physical security or our constitutional 
values. In a nuclear context, for example, this paradigm may result in a diminution of 
an essential ability to locate the threat while at the same time minimizing or eliminat-
ing opportunities to determine if extant authorities are used wisely. Instead of trading-
off, we must find ways to optimize both values. After all, liberty is one of the values the 
Constitution seeks to secure; and, physical security permits the exercise of liberty.
Good process is a start. The effective application of process before action is taken, 
and through effective appraisal after it is taken, helps to ensure that operating as-
sumptions that may have been considered under constraints of speed and secrecy are 
validated. Where they are not validated, use of the tool should stop. Such processes 
not only ensure that the security tools are used in accordance with law, they also allo-
cate finite resources to more palpable threats. 
It is the duty of lawyers—and the law through use of process—to find where and 
when this has occurred and, in a timely manner, adjust the instruments of security on 
to the correct target area. This role is no less patriotic than that of ferreting out the 
opponent. Surely, it takes more moral courage to stop an unwarranted or unsubstanti-
ated national security investigation than it does to start one, “just to play it safe.” The 
risk of being wrong in the first instance is concrete and potentially measured in the 
loss of human life; the risk of being “wrong” in the second instance is specific to the 
target of surveillance, but otherwise diffuse and often unknown in terms of the soci-
etal risk to our collective constitutional values. 
There are ways to regulate broad authority that go beyond trust and do not rely 
exclusively on the moral integrity of executive actors and their lawyers. The substan-
tive framework itself can minimize the risk of unwarranted intrusion. In the case of 
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data mining, for example, the degree of intrusion will depend on the nature of the 
data searched, the pattern used to search, and the model used to analyze the data lo-
cated. Pattern analysis might be designed to identify persons who have engaged in 
certain behaviors at a time-certain, e.g., men aged 20-40, who have traveled to Europe 
in the past month and have bank accounts in Boston. Computer modeling tools seek 
to relate data in meaningful manner, perhaps through the identification of predictive 
behavior, patterns of conduct that might suggest a degree of heightened risk, and as-
sociational data, which might identify links between seemingly unconnected persons. 
Telephone calling patterns might indicate that an unknown actor has telephoned an 
unknown phone number with the same frequency as a terrorist suspect. The computer 
algorithms can be set and applied so as to limit the data searched, and to alert if ex-
traneous (or unauthorized) data is collected or retained. 
In the end, however, procedural thresholds are more reliable than substantive 
thresholds in regulating the use of authorized tools. First, procedural standards usu-
ally entail review by persons beyond those immediately involved in the selection and 
use of the intelligence instrument in the first instance. Independent actors in or out-
side the executive branch can test and validate executive actions. Where surveillance 
has been conducted pursuant to the FISA, for example, it is the independent actors, 
the FISA judges, and internally the lawyers, who have the role of testing substantive 
propositions and asking the difficult questions of why, what, and for how long? 
Second, most national security standards are malleable, especially when “vital na-
tional security” interests are at stake, like protecting the country from WMD attack. 
In the covert action context, for example, it is the process that generates careful re-
view, not the necessity of the President finding that an action “supports identifiable 
foreign policy objectives,” as the law requires. 
Third, emphasis on process rather than substantive absolutes will also result in a 
more inclusive result, which for the reasons below, will be more sustainable and en-
hance security. 
IV.  A LASTING ARCHITECTURE 
Because the threat of WMD terrorism is enduring, United States legal policy should 
embrace not only a threat-based paradigm, but a corresponding long-term outlook. 
An enduring legal framework is one that defines the exercise of presidential authority 
not in absolutes, or in terms of emergency or exigent circumstance alone, but in terms 
of optimums that will sustain commitment over decades. Such a long term framework 
permits opportunity to catch our constitutional breath, and find our equilibrium, and 
if need be start over again. And, it is a framework that embraces rather than eschews 
processes of executive, legislative, and judicial deliberation where deliberation is war-
ranted and time permits.
Emphasis on the immediate over the long-term nature of the threat diminishes the 
value of process and law in the development of better national security policy because 
process and law take time to shape and refine. The National Security Council (“NSC”) 
process, as a normative baseline, works well in part because it has evolved over time. 
As with the military chain of command, bureaucracies have conditioned themselves 
to the process. Not surprisingly, homeland security process is less well-developed. It is 
too early to tell, for example, whether the Homeland Security Council (“HSC”) and 
related process will become a permanent part of security process or a passing experi-
ment. The same can be said for the Department of Homeland Security as the head-
quarters element for many of the essential homeland security agencies. In times of 
 The Journal of the ACS Issue Groups 29 
crisis and with matters of immediacy, the tendency is to stick with existing mecha-
nisms or laws, or to adopt immediate ad hoc mechanisms, because the costs of defin-
ing new regimes outweigh the immediate benefits. In constitutional terms, that means 
reliance on the Commander in Chief’s authority to define and refine new internal and 
external processes. But is that the preferred outcome? 
a.		the	central	role	oF	the	PreSident	aS	commander	in	chieF
Make no mistake: The President, by constitutional design and statute, is the cen-
tral and essential national security actor. The Constitution makes him so. As 
Commander in Chief, he is charged to “preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution.”17 The Constitution requires that he swear an oath to do so. He is also 
the Chief Executive who alone has the legal, bureaucratic, and moral capacity to co-
ordinate and direct the intelligence instrument and unify national plans for homeland 
security and defense. 
These are not statements of constitutional interpretation or executive assertion 
(although in breadth they may become so). This is constitutional law. It is statutory 
law as well. The Congress and not just the President have placed the President at the 
head of the security table, at the NSC and the HSC. In turn, the NSC and HSC sys-
tems serve as the President’s principal processes for national security decision-mak-
ing.18 The National Security Act also makes the President the essential intelligence 
consumer and decision-maker. Thus, since 1947 the CIA has performed “such other 
functions and duties related to intelligence affecting national security as the President 
may direct.”19 
Further, in time of conflict, the President’s role expands, not just because he is the 
Commander in Chief, but for the intangible reasons Alexander Hamilton identified 
when he wrote: “Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national 
conduct … It is the nature of war to increase the Executive at the expense of the legis-
lative authority.”20 
It is not surprising then that, as a matter of presidential choice, constitutional per-
spective, or perhaps by necessity, the President’s constitutional authority, and in par-
ticular the Commander in Chief clause, has been central to the post 9/11 legal debate. 
But, as Justice Jackson observed, just what powers accompany that authority has 
“plagued presidential advisors who would not waive or narrow it by non assertion yet 
cannot say where it begins and ends.”21 It is worth pausing to recall that Justice 
Jackson was addressing the Commander in Chief clause in the context of a different 
president with different lawyers—who also did not wish to dilute or cede presidential 
authority in time of conflict.
17	To be sure, as a matter of law, persons appointed to certain positions in the federal government also 
swear to “support and defend” the Constitution. The presidential oath reflects the responsibility, which 
derives from the President’s collective constitutional authorities as well as the National Security Act, which 
create the President’s responsibility to prevent attack. 
18	Memorandum on Organization of the National Security Council System (NSPD-1) (Feb. 13, 2001); 
Memorandum on Organization of the National Security Council (PDD-2) (Jan 20, 1993).
19	National Security Act of 1974 §103(d)(5), 50 U.S.C. §403-3(d)(5)(2006), amended by Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 §104A(d)(4), P.L. 108-458. Many of the other security tools 
are predicated on presidential decision as well, like IEEPA, and certain of the Foreign Assistance draw-
down authorities.
20	tHe federAliSt no. 8 (Alexander Hamilton).
21	Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641(1952)(Jackson, concurring).
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They dare not do so. When it comes to the constitutional separation of powers, 
where one sits often influences how one stands on the law. But it is not just the law that 
looks differently depending on where one sits. It is also one’s sense of responsibility—
the roles are different. In Youngstown, Jackson cautioned that the Courts should be 
the last branch, rather than the first to give up our constitutional form of government. 
Presidents, however, are more likely to place security before liberty in defining their 
roles; or to place the thought in constitutional context, to emphasize their singular re-
sponsibility as Commander in Chief to defend the U.S. 
Future presidents, who assume responsibility for protecting the nation from nucle-
ar and other attack, will also focus on the immediate. As a result, they too will look 
to the Commander in Chief clause to find the flexibility, speed, and authority they feel 
they need. This point warrants emphasis. Presidents will act when they feel the coun-
try threatened from attack. Thus, as in international law, where presidents of both 
parties have expressed, at least in theory, a desire to use force in concert with U.S. al-
lies, all presidents have reserved the right to use unilateral force when necessary.22 The 
same imperatives are at play in constitutional context. The Executive will act, either 
pursuant to executive authority alone or pursuant to an inclusive and meaningful 
framework agreed to by the political branches. 
b.	 the	central	role	oF	the	PreSident	Should	not	obScure		
the	advantageS	oF	conStitutional	incluSion	
An enduring legal framework should address this practice realistically by seeking 
preferred functional outcomes. Absolute and exigent positions, legal and political, 
make it hard to do so. The focus on the Commander in Chief authority has also dis-
tracted from equally important elements of a long-term framework because of the 
Manichaean nature of the debate. Arguments about the Commander in Chief clause, 
couched in absolutes, drive advocates into their constitutional corners. Advocates of a 
broad reading of the Commander in Chief clause tend to disregard the President’s 
parallel responsibilities to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” including 
statutory law and the application of the framework of the Constitution itself, with its 
checks and balances between branches. They also tend to overlook longstanding legal 
traditions distinguishing between foreign and domestic applications of law. Advocates 
of limited presidential authority, on the other hand, tend to downplay the nature of 
the threat as well as the President’s singular constitutional responsibility as Chief 
Executive and Commander in Chief to protect the country from attack.
In a long-term conflict the preferred paradigm is one that is constitutionally inclu-
sive, in which the extraordinary circumstance remains the exception and not the 
norm—in practice as well as law. Such a framework recognizes the need for exigent 
action, and provides mechanisms to trigger appropriate appraisal when doing so. This 
is the formula adopted in the covert action context, where the law incorporates the 
seemingly incompatible constitutional positions of the political branches—in the case 
of the legislative branch, a right to prior notification, and in the case of the Executive, 
a right to withhold notification until after the fact.23 The result preserves both consti-
tutional positions by defining a norm of prior notification but recognizing the excep-
tion as well. Thus, in “extraordinary circumstances” the president may limit prior 
22	The “National Security Strategies” of President Clinton and President George W. Bush use almost 
identical language in making this point, which tracks as well with numerous public statements of presi-
dents past and present. 
23	 50 U.S.C. §§413b(c)(1)-(3)(2006).
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notification of covert actions to select members. And, in exceptions that go beyond 
even the extraordinary, the Act comprehends that the President might withhold notifi-
cation altogether. But, the law requires him to inform the Congress that he did so and 
to justify the reasons for doing so. The exceptional argument is reserved for the excep-
tional moment. Ultimate constitutional arguments are deferred for when they are ad-
dressed to specific scenarios. This makes sense in a context where policy options may 
range from low threshold actions like press placements to covert acts of war. 
The covert action statute is also process oriented. The law provides substantive au-
thority, but is largely designed to encourage deliberation and accountability through 
the creation of procedural thresholds—foremost the requirement that the 
President personally “find” that the covert action in question is “necessary to support 
identifiable foreign policy objectives and is important to the national security of the 
United States.”24 This is not a high substantive threshold, but it is an important 
procedural threshold. Because the law also requires that findings specify certain im-
plementation mechanisms, the president is accountable for both the policy and its im-
plementation. Thus, through process, the law ensures that activities that historically 
have borne heightened policy and legal risks are vetted at the highest levels and in an 
accountable way.
Laws of constitutional inclusion, focused on process and review, have a number of 
concrete security advantages. Inclusive laws maximize the Executive’s authority to act. 
An inclusive process is also more effective in validating options and thus achieving in-
tended security results. Such laws are also more likely to be passed, enacted, and fol-
lowed. Where the political branches have agreed on mechanisms to address differences 
of law or substance in context, the Executive will be less likely to fill the legal void 
with assertions of constitutional authority. This should result in greater sustained 
support over years for essential security instruments and policies. It should also in-
crease, but not necessarily solidify, public confidence that U.S. security instruments are 
being used lawfully and effectively. This confidence should increase where the judicial 
branch also plays a role in validating facts and law. 
Operational Authority: An inclusive paradigm maximizes the Executive’s authority 
to act. This is a legal truism reflected in the Youngstown paradigm. The President acts 
at the zenith of his authority when he acts pursuant to congressional authorization as 
well as pursuant to his own constitutional authority. But this point is sometimes lost 
in the separation of powers scramble, especially where the Commander in Chief au-
thority is used. 
An exclusive and excessive reliance on unilateral executive authority may also, iron-
ically, lead to a diminution of operational authority. Where the Congress or the courts 
perceive that the Executive has overreached, they may restrict the Executive in ways 
that place intended and unintended substantive limits on executive action. Larger de-
bates over constitutional authority in one context may spill over into other contexts, 
resulting in hesitation to assert an argument or perhaps undue debate over its validity.
In the homeland security context, for example, an immediate and overwhelming 
federal response may be the essential policy ingredient to address an incipient, but po-
tentially catastrophic event. But such an intervention might necessarily occur where 
the facts are inchoate, and thus in the face of state and local opposition. In reaction to 
the use of executive authority in one context, the Congress may pass legislation to 
24	 50 U.S.C. §413b(a)(2006).
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curtail or limit the President’s reliance on constitutional authority generally, or in a 
different context. Whether constitutional or not, congressional opposition may in-
crease the political costs to a president in acting, making the president hesitant to act. 
Of course, the President can help to address this situation by reserving the exceptional 
legal argument for the truly exceptional factual circumstance. 
 
Support and Commitment: This conflict is different in many ways from past U.S. 
conflicts, including the nature of the opponent, the scope and intermittent nature of 
threat at home, and the role of law. This conflict is also different because it is endur-
ing, meaning that it will be fought through administrations and over decades. In other 
words, constitutional “command” will transition from one president to the next, rath-
er than reside exclusively with a Lincoln, Wilson, or a Roosevelt. Enduring threats re-
quire enduring rather than ad hoc solutions that will stand the test of time and the 
transition between political parties. 
A long-term solution that garners the support of only one party or one branch 
should be viewed with suspicion, not because it may not be the correct policy, but be-
cause it is less likely to be sustained over time. With finite resources, the United States 
can ill afford needless vacillations in policy and funding. Moreover, a policy that can-
not win the sustained support of both political parties in the Congress is unlikely to 
persuade allies and intelligence partners of its credibility. If the U.S. policy is not cred-
ible, our allies and liaison partners may delay or demur in identifying terrorist actors 
overseas or transferring such actors to U.S. custody.
As a result, at home, as abroad, divisive legal arguments and stratagems should be 
eschewed where there are viable legal arguments that will gain broader support. 
Lawyers might favor that outcome because it tends to emphasize constitutional struc-
ture. Security specialists should favor that outcome because the threat is potentially 
catastrophic and enduring and we need to maximize both domestic and international 
support in combating the threat over years.25 
V. PRINCIPLES APPLIED—DETAINEES AND RENDITION
Having described four essential principles that should inform a lasting legal archi-
tecture, it may be useful to consider how these principles might apply in context. 
“Guantanamo” is a lightening rod, but it is just the most visible facet of a series of 
related intelligence, interrogation, adjudication, and detention issues. These issues 
include: 
• How should the U.S. balance the need for intelligence to prevent future attack 
with legal values and principles that define who we are and, in the longer run, 
will deter recruitment to the extremists cause?
• What law applies, or should apply, to persons seized on and off the “battle-
field” in a conflict against non-state actors engaged in terrorism? 
• What role, if any, and in accordance with what procedural and substantive 
limitations should rendition, secret detention, and coercive interrogation play 
in such a conflict?
25	The list of principles discussed in this article is not exhaustive. Global threats require global re-
sponses. A long-term architecture should therefore seek to better shape and then harness the positive value 
of international law to U.S. security practice. See	J. Baker, What’s International Law Got to Do With It? 
Transnational Law and the Intelligence Mission, 28 micH. J. int’l l. 639 (2007). 
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There are no easy answers to these questions because they find root in six some-
time competing policies and values. That means that singular substantive answers in 
the form of permits or prohibitions are unavailing. 
First, detainees can and have provided valuable intelligence.26 An isolated prisoner, 
without benefit of counsel or friendly contact is more likely to succumb to interroga-
tion. We know this from domestic law enforcement interrogation.27 
Second, the United States has, will, and must detain persons who have as a goal 
wanton killing, including through mass casualty events. 
Third, there have been and will be persons detained by the United States who are 
not in fact lawful or unlawful combatants. This may result from mistaken identity, a 
process of bounty, or from terrorists using non-combatants for concealment. It might 
also result from the absence of a clear demarcation line between those who passively 
associate with terrorist groups and those who actively participate. 
Fourth, “Guantanamo” as a symbol of U.S. rendition and detention practice, has 
had significant negative impact on how the United States is perceived. Perception can 
fuel conflict and deter alliance and liaison. 
 Fifth, some detainees who have been released from U.S. detention have returned to 
the conflict and been captured a second time. Others, no doubt, are at large.
 Sixth, there is some agreement on the law. This agreement embraces an under-
standing that detainees should be subject to a bifurcated process of adjudication, first 
of their status, and then, if appropriate, allegations of unlawful conduct. The debate 
seems focused on how to do this, not on whether it should be done. 
In light of these factors, the central question is: Where should we be in twenty years, 
not twenty months, and how do we get there today? There are pros and cons incum-
bent with every option. There are only obvious answers if one believes that the threat 
is one dimensional—to our physical security alone, or to our legal values alone. 
Answering these questions requires us to be honest about the threat, its risks on one 
side, and its duration on the other, as well the intangible costs and benefits to U.S. poli-
cy caused by the legal choices we make. If we cannot persuade ourselves—across par-
ties and between administrations—we surely cannot hope to persuade a wider 
audience.
 We will more likely succeed in answering this question in sustained manner if we 
break it down into its constituent parts—capture, interrogation, status adjudication, 
conduct adjudication, detention, and release—rather than just “Guantanamo.” Where 
mixed values are at stake and sometimes in tension as they are here, rigorous contex-
tual process is also the best mechanism for adjudicating competing national security 
interests and values. Such contextual review is not facilitated by the resort to banners, 
like security and liberty or, for that matter, “Guantanamo.” Closing Gitmo may be 
wise, but Guantanamo is a symptom not a solution. Detainees will still be taken, they 
must still be interrogated, and their status and conduct must still be adjudicated. 
Then, they must be detained somewhere. The less the United States takes the lead in 
these areas the more likely it will employ third-country locations or alternatives 
through the process of ordinary and extraordinary rendition.
Rendition is an important security tool.28 It is a faster and more secure means to 
26	E.g., Mark Bowden, The Ploy,	AtlAntic montHly, May 2007.
27	 Interrogation is inherently coercive; I am not engaged in a euphemism about coercive methodology, 
only making a point about physical isolation at the outset of detention.
28 For a fuller discussion of the legal, moral, and policy issues surrounding “extraordinary rendition,” 
see bAker, supra note 11, at Ch. 7.
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transfer suspects than extradition or deportation, including from a locale where they 
are not subject to lawful prosecution to one where they are. Rendition allows states 
that are either unwilling or unable to transfer subjects publicly to do so secretly. 
Rendition also raises the prospect of gathering intelligence and making further arrests 
before a subject’s colleagues are aware of his capture. The prospect, accurate or oth-
erwise, of third-party rendition may also induce subjects to cooperate. 
Rendition is also subject to mistake and misuse. Advantages in secrecy and speed 
create risk. Persons rendered to third countries may be subjected to unlawful practic-
es, including torture and extrajudicial punishment. Further, in the absence of the pro-
cedural safeguards applicable to extradition, subjects may be misidentified; or, where 
correctly identified, may be transferred based on information that is not subject to ad-
judication or independent validation through judicial and media oversight. Moreover, 
secrecy and speed can result in an internal process that minimizes the ordinary cross-
checking that occurs when decisions are sent up the chain of command. 
There is also little question that apparent mistakes or “notorious” cases become 
the lens through which the general audience evaluates the practice. As a result, rendi-
tion has taken on an importance in public perception disproportionate to its actual 
role in practice. To some, the United States commitment to the rule of law is judged 
by this practice, or better said, by real or perceived failures in practice. 
Where the United States is perceived to act outside the law or its legal values, secu-
rity may also be damaged and not just in intangible ways. Officials may be banned or 
placed at greater risk when operating overseas. Foreign governments may hesitate to 
act, share, or transfer at the critical moment when an attack might be averted. U.S. 
flight clearance may be denied.
For all these reasons, rendition practice warrants careful regulation, but regulation 
and not blind proscription. It is a necessary tool whose risks, costs, and benefits are 
best assessed in context. A good process for authorizing renditions is one that:
• Includes role-playing by persons not directly associated with the proposed 
activity, including persons whose sole responsibility is to the law and to the 
foreign policy implications of the conduct in question.
• Is secret and fast, but also meaningfully considers the predicate for rendition; 
the range of alternatives for displacing the subject and the U.S. experience 
with each alternative; the opportunities available to garner intelligence from 
the subject, based in part on projections of knowledge; the relative merits of 
public prosecution in the United States or a third state; and the actual and 
potential positive and negative repercussions of each rendition operation.
• Takes substance into account. Process is also substance where it dictates 
which views are considered or excluded, which options are tabled, and which 
risks are addressed. With respect to rendition, if one wants to “get to yes,” 
then one should limit the decisional process to national security specialists. If 
one wants to “get to no,” then one might give a veto to those officials respon-
sible for human rights. Within an agency, the same results might be obtained 
by selecting the persons who attend a decisional meeting. That is not to say 
intelligence personnel do not value human rights, or human rights advocates 
do not value physical security. But if an official is charged with providing for 
security, chances are that as a matter of culture, practice, and interpretation, 
that official will lean in the direction of his or her perceived role.
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With responsibility comes accountability, and with accountability comes care. A 
good process establishes a chain of responsibility for confirming identity, vetting op-
erational details and, where applicable obtaining and verifying meaningful assurances 
from third countries. Here, the law might encourage rigorous process by requiring 
written authorization at the highest level of government feasible under operational 
circumstances, prior to third-country transfers. A process of periodic, rather than op-
erational, external validation can also test whether practices that should remain ex-
traordinary in practice, do indeed remain extraordinary rather than normative in 
practice as well as in name. Finally, a good process will double back, and once beyond 
the moment of necessity, consider whether the results were morally and legally sound 
and the security benefit validated.
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Law is not an abstraction, but an instrument intended to address real threats and 
sustain our constitutional values while doing so, to provide for the common defense 
of our physical security, our liberty, and our way of governance. 
The terrorism threat is potentially catastrophic and in response we should adopt a 
legal architecture that is broad and flexible in authority. Use of the authorities in prac-
tice may be controversial but the necessity of having these tools in the counterterror-
ism quiver should not be, at least not if the threat is nuclear in dimension. Our legal 
architecture should also respond to security culture and practice, including the prac-
tice of presidents in executing their responsibility to protect the United States from 
attack. Presidents will act in response to threats. The question is: in accord with what 
framework? 
Practice advises that where there is broad authority, there is increased risk of over-
reaching and thus a corresponding risk to our constitutional values and process of 
government. Independent mechanisms of appraisal, by detached executive actors, or 
through review by different branches of government are the most effective way to ap-
praise options and then evaluate their implementation. Proactive appraisal results in 
better decisions. Independent actors ask tougher questions and are more probing in 
testing results. They also safeguard against bureaucratic propensities toward group 
think, factual complacency, secrecy, and default tendencies of security bureaucracies 
to allow the mission and not the law to define the exercise of power. Moreover, such 
appraisals make it easier to defend decisions internally and externally in the face of 
unanticipated, unintended, or simply unpleasant outcomes. 
Finally, our legal architecture should maximize the use of law as a positive security 
value and virtue. In few other conflicts have the reaction of other states—and, as im-
portantly, their citizenry—played such an important role in the conduct of the 
conflict. The United States is dependent on intelligence gathered at the ground level 
through law enforcement and intelligence liaison. The United States also depends on 
immediate access to foreign territory, or alternatively, credible local assistance. 
Our opponents rely on the cycle of action-reaction to U.S. policy, including legal 
policy, as a recruiting mechanism. If law defines who we are, it also distinguishes us 
from our opponents and defines how we are seen by others in a global contest with 
extremist terrorism.
 
